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Abstract
The traditional economic loss rule precludes plaintiffs—such as those
affected by the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill—from recovering losses
not resulting from damage to person or property. Most states have applied
the rule to various circumstances and have carved out several exceptions
over time, including one for commercial fishermen. In the Florida Supreme
Court’s decision in Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC,1 the court expanded
the duty element in negligence to new reaches for claims of pure economic
loss. As a result, Florida now unquestionably promises the greatest
opportunity compared to the other Gulf states for recovery of pure
economic losses due to the negligence of a polluter such as Mosaic
Fertilizer or BP. The issue that remains unclear after Curd is whether and
how far this newly stated duty will extend beyond commercial fishermen to
parties such as distributors, restaurants, fisheries, and fish brokers.
This Article provides a brief background of the pure economic loss rule
and its application in Florida, pre- and post-Curd. The Article also
provides the first in-depth analysis of the treatment of the pure economic
loss rule in each of the Gulf states—Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and
Texas—as well as their applicable federal circuits. The analysis illustrates
that Florida’s rule, following Curd, is the most amenable to plaintiffs. In
the end, it is unclear just how far the holding in Curd may stretch or limit
the economic loss rule in Florida and how much litigation will see the
inside of a courthouse based on Curd’s precedent.
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1246
I.

THE FOUNDATION OF THE PURE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE
AND ITS HISTORY IN FLORIDA ................................................ 1249
A. AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co.: Strict Adherence ................................... 1251
*

J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law; Associate, Avera & Smith, LLP. As
with all I do, this Article is dedicated to Stacey, Mason, and Isaac. Thanks to the Florida Law
Review and its honorable members; to my co-author, a brilliant man whose friendship I will always
cherish; and special thanks, to a special man, to whom so many students owe so much—Professor
Dennis A. Calfee.
**
J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law; Law Clerk for the Honorable Judge Ed
Carnes, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. I thank the Lord for life and all
the blessings therein. I dedicate this work to two women in my life, my mother, Vinnett Simpson,
and my love, Kemi-Ann Godfrey. Lastly, I commend the members of the Florida Law Review and
their faculty adviser, Professor Dennis A. Calfee, for their honorable and dedicated work.
1. Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216 (Fla. 2010).
1245

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 5 [2011], Art. 5

1246

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

B. Casa Clara Condominium Ass’n v. Charley Toppino
& Sons, Inc.: A Noteworthy Dissent .............................. 1252
C. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. American
Aviation, Inc.: Change, but Duty Remains .................... 1252
II.

CURD V. MOSAIC FERTILIZER, LLC: DUTY EXTENDED
AD INFINITUM? ...................................................................... 1254
A. The Majority Opinion .................................................... 1254
B. Justice Polston: Articulating the Potential
Cardozian Nightmare .................................................... 1256
C. The Aftermath: Curd as a Roadmap for BP
Claimants....................................................................... 1257

III.

VENUE SHOPPING: COMPARING THE PROSPECTS FOR
POTENTIAL BP CLAIMANTS ACROSS THE AFFECTED
GULF STATES ......................................................................... 1261
A. Eleventh Circuit ............................................................. 1261
B. Alabama ......................................................................... 1262
C. Fifth Circuit ................................................................... 1263
D. Louisiana ....................................................................... 1268
E. Texas .............................................................................. 1271
F. Mississippi ..................................................................... 1272

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 1275
INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, an explosion lacerated the Deepwater Horizon oil
rig, beginning the largest accidental oil spill in the history of the petroleum
industry.2 Initial leakage estimates ranged from 1,000 to 19,000 barrels per
day.3 The first study of the spill performed by a peer-reviewed journal
concluded that the oil began flowing at a rate of approximately 56,000
barrels per day, eventually leaking approximately 4.4 million barrels of
crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico.4 Businesses and individuals who relied
on Gulf waters for their livelihoods were hit extremely hard.5 Although BP
2. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING,
at vi (2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf; Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf
Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A14.
3. Kevin Krajick et al., The Earth Institute at Columbia University, Study Affirms Gulf Oil
Spill’s Vastness (Sep. 23, 2010), www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/articles/view/2730 (citing
Timothy J. Crone & Maya Tolstoy, Magnitude of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico Oil Leak, 330 SCIENCE
MAG. 634, 634 (2010)).
4. Id.
5. See Susan Buchanan, Fishermen Clinging to Livelihoods During Spill Recovery, LA.
WEEKLY, Nov. 22, 2010.
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established a fund to help those affected, resistance and difficulty have
plagued many who attempt to receive fund benefits.6 Already, a vast
number of individual and class-action claims have been filed against BP
for the company’s apparent failures in managing the distribution of fund
benefits.7
During the time that the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was consuming
the daily news cycle, the Florida Supreme Court handed down a landmark
decision that may have turned Florida into a favorable jurisdiction for those
affected by the spill. In Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC,8 the Florida
Supreme Court gutted a key restriction to plaintiffs’ recovery of pure
economic losses. Beyond merely recognizing a commercial fishermen
exception to the economic loss rule9—a far from radical proposition—the
Florida Supreme Court, in a lawsuit alleging negligence, also held that the
polluter owed a duty of care to those who fell within the “zone of risk”10
the polluter created. This extension of duty, as one Florida justice warned
in a separate opinion,11 has the potential to create a Cardozian nightmare of
“liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class.”12
The traditional economic loss rule precludes plaintiffs—such as
Howard Curd, a commercial fisherman, and those affected by the BP
spill—from recovering losses not resulting from damage to person or
property.13 A major justification for applying the rule to common law
negligence claims is the classic “floodgates” argument famously articulated
by Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo. In his opinion in Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche,14 Judge Cardozo warned that the duty element of common law
negligence must have boundaries for fear of subjecting a tortfeasor to the
aforementioned indeterminate liability to an indeterminate class.15 Most
states have applied the rule to various circumstances and have carved out
several exceptions over time, including one for commercial fishermen.
After the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Curd, Florida now
unquestionably promises the greatest chances for recovery of pure
economic losses due to the negligence of a polluter such as Mosaic
Fertilizer or BP when compared to the other Gulf states.16
6. Brian Skoloff, Problems Plague BP Compensation Fund, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 6,
2010, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39525091/ns/us_news-life/.
7. Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Lawyers Lining Up for Class-Action Suits Over Oil
Spill, WASH. POST, May 17, 2010, at A01, available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/05/16/AR2010051603254.html?sub=AR.
8. 39 So. 3d 1216 (Fla. 2010).
9. Id. at 1223.
10. Id. at 1228.
11. Id. at 1232 (Polston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12. Id. (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)).
13. Id. at 1223–24 (citing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1974)).
14. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
15. Id. at 444.
16. See infra Part III (conducting a state-by-state and circuit-by-circuit analysis of the pure
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The issue that remains unclear after Curd—which involved a class
broader than one comprising solely commercial fishermen—is just how far
this newly stated duty will extend. Florida Supreme Court Justice Ricky
Polston addressed this issue in a separate opinion.17 Concurring in part and
dissenting in part, Justice Polston recognized that while the court’s opinion
purported to address only the claims of “commercial fishermen,” the
plaintiffs’ proposed class was broader and included “all fishermen and
those persons engaged in the commercial catch and sale of fish.”18 Justice
Polston opined that “the majority’s decision does not extend to distributors,
seafood restaurants, fisheries, fish brokers, or the like who may have been
affected by Mosaic’s pollution.”19 However, the majority opinion is far
from explicit on that point. Rather, it provides a roadmap for such
prospective plaintiffs’ claims.20 Therefore, it seems a foregone conclusion
that the majority’s opinion will be put to the test by future, non-fishermen
plaintiffs.
What if a distributor, seafood restaurant, fishery, fish broker, or the like
asked a Florida court to award damages for purely economic losses
suffered as a result of a polluter such as BP? In Louisiana, a very popular
chef filed suit against BP for the economic losses she incurred as a result of
the Deepwater Horizon spill.21 Could that chef rely on Curd were her
restaurant in Florida? What about other businesses that rely on the
waterways or claim economic losses from a decline in tourism-related
business as a result of the spill?22 Just how far will the duty extend? And
how will Florida determine the “indeterminate class”?
Part I of this Article provides a brief background of the pure economic
loss rule and its application in Florida, including an analysis of pre-Curd
Florida precedent evidencing the evolution and eventual diminishment of
the economic loss rule. Part II analyzes the Curd case—its facts,
economic loss rule’s application in the Gulf States).
17. Curd, 39 So. 3d 1216 at 1228 (Polston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. Id. at 1229 (quoting Petitioner’s Fourth Amended Complaint) (“As an initial matter, I
note that the majority decides the case for a more narrow class than those bringing the suit and more
narrowly than the claims they allege.”)
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1227–28 (majority opinion) (analyzing the elements of negligence under Florida
law and establishing the element of duty, which is at the center of the traditional economic loss
rule); see also infra Section II.C.
21. Dennis Persica, The Times-Picayune, Chef Susan Spicer Sues BP, Others Over Oil Spill
in Gulf of Mexico, TIMES-PICAYUNENOLA.COM (New Orleans, La.), June 27, 2010,
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/06/chef_susan_spicer_sues_bp_othe.h tml.
Chef Susan Spicer is not the first chef or restaurateur to file suit against BP. Id. However, while the
majority of these suits are aimed only at establishing the right to collect from the claims fund
established by BP, Chef Spicer is also seeking direct money damages against BP. Id.
22. See the U.S. Travel Association’s report on the Gulf spill for an in-depth analysis of the
potential long-term impact on tourism as a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. OXFORD ECON.
FOR THE U.S. TRAVEL ASS’N, POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE GULF OIL SPILL ON TOURISM (2010),
available at http://www.bpgulfoilspilllawsuit.com/supporting-studies/117-oxford-economicspotential-impact-of-the-gulf-oil-spill-on-tourism.
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procedural history, and the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court.
Additionally, Part II examines and addresses the concerns Justice Polston
expressed in his separate opinion. Lastly, Part II analogizes the holding in
Curd to the potential claims available to those affected by the BP spill and
other plaintiffs adversely affected by polluters. Part III provides the first indepth analysis of the treatment of the pure economic loss rule in each of
the Gulf states—Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas—as well as
their applicable federal circuits. The analysis illustrates that Florida’s rule,
following Curd, is the most amenable to plaintiff claims. In the end, it is
unclear just how far the holding in Curd may stretch the economic loss rule
(or lack thereof) in Florida and how much litigation will see the inside of a
courthouse based on Curd’s precedent.
I. THE FOUNDATION OF THE PURE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE AND ITS
HISTORY IN FLORIDA
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint23 is the seminal case in
American jurisprudence establishing the common law pure economic loss
rule. The plaintiffs in Robins were charterers of a vessel that the defendant
carelessly damaged during an inspection.24 When there were delays
because of the necessary repairs, the plaintiffs incurred lost profits because
of their inability to sail as planned.25 The plaintiffs’ claims sounded in
negligence and sought recovery for purely economic losses.26 In an opinion
written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,27 the U.S. Supreme Court
denied recovery to the plaintiffs for those purely economic losses because
they had no proprietary interest in the damaged vessel.28 Justice Holmes’
opinion established the bright-line rule that tort liability cannot derive from
pure economic loss.29
Despite being a decision in admiralty, lower courts have since applied
the Robins decision to claims of common law negligence.30 Barber Lines
A/S v. M/V DonauMaru31 provides an example of a court applying the
Robins rule in a case with facts similar to those in Curd. The ship
DonauMaru spilled fuel into Boston Harbor and caused damage to a dock

23. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
24. Id. at 307.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 303.
28. Id. at 309–10.
29. Id.
30. Some scholars argue that the prevailing understanding of Justice Holmes’ opinion is
flawed; the opinion does not, in fact, establish a special rule for pure economic loss. See Peter
Benson, The Problem with Pure Economic Loss, 60 S.C. L. REV. 823, 826, 878 (2009) (providing
an in-depth analysis of the Robins decision, the economic loss rule, and a proposition that the
dominant approach to pure economic loss is flawed).
31. 764 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1985).
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owned by a third party.32 The damaged dock made it impossible for
another ship, the Tamara, to dock.33 When the Tamara was forced to dock
and unload its cargo elsewhere, its owners incurred significant additional
costs for fuel, docking, and labor.34 After the trial court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ claim, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment and held that
“controlling case law denies that a plaintiff can recover damages for
negligently caused financial harm, even when foreseeable, except in special
circumstances.”35 The court then stated that the “most common” special
circumstance is “physical injury to the plaintiffs or to their property.”36
Echoing the floodgates sentiment of Chief Judge Cardozo in Ultramares,
the First Circuit illustrated the effect of reversing the lower court using a
hypothetical “downtown auto accident.” Liability would attach for the
damages suffered by not only the few people who may have been
physically hurt, but also the hundreds more who experienced damages due
to the subsequent traffic delay.37 The court acknowledged that the Robins
precedent may have seen its time pass based on more recent
jurisprudence.38 Nonetheless, the court concluded that it could not reverse
the “general judicial principle that (with exceptions) forbids recoveries for
negligently caused purely financial losses.”39
Lest it be thought that Barber Lines signaled a modern strict adherence
to the traditional rule, the reality has been quite the opposite. Courts have
carved out exceptions to the blanket no-liability roots of the rule, and the
majority of states and jurisdictions have recently retreated from such harsh
results for plaintiffs.40 Florida is no different, and the evolution of the
traditional rule has led to the Florida Supreme Court narrowing its
application to only a few circumstances. The cases of AFM Corp. v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,41 Casa Clara Condominium
Ass’n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino and Sons, Inc.,42 and Indemnity Insurance
Co. of North America v. American Aviation, Inc.,43 provide a clear history
32. Id. at 50.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 54 (“The typical downtown auto accident, that harms a few persons physically and
physically damages the property of several others, may well cause financial harm (e.g., through
delay) to a vast number of potential plaintiffs.”).
38. Id. at 53.
39. Id. at 57.
40. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 566–67 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1974) (recognizing
cases where economic losses have been “recovered for the negligence of pension consultants,
accountants, architects, attorneys, notaries public, test hole drillers, title abstractors, termite
inspectors, soil engineers, surveyors, real estate brokers, drawers of checks, directors of
corporations, trustees, bailees and public weighers”).
41. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
42. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993).
43. 891 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2004).
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of how the rule has been adopted, adapted, and eventually narrowed for
claims of negligence in Florida.
A. AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.:
Strict Adherence
In AFM Corp., the plaintiff entered into a Yellow Pages advertising
agreement with Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company.44
Between the execution of the contract and the placement of the
advertisements, the plaintiff moved offices and changed phone numbers in
order to use an automatic phone referral system.45 When the Yellow Pages
were eventually distributed, the plaintiff’s old telephone number was
printed in the advertisement—a number that was, in the interim, assigned
to another Southern Bell customer who promptly disconnected the referral
system.46 After more mistakes on the part of Southern Bell, the plaintiff
sued and asserted a claim for economic losses based solely on a theory of
tort and common law negligence.47 In its review, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court,
which then consolidated them into a single question: Does “Florida permit
a purchaser of services to recover economic losses in tort without a claim
for personal injury or property damage?”48
Just months prior to deciding AFM Corp., the Florida Supreme Court
decided Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,49
holding that where negligence claims derive from a contract, contract
principles are better suited than tort principles for remedying pure
economic losses.50 Although AFM Corp. addressed a contract for services
while Florida Power & Light addressed the issue in a contract for goods,
the court reached the same conclusion for both: “[W]ithout some conduct
resulting in personal injury or property damage, there can be no
independent tort flowing from a contractual breach which would justify a
tort claim solely for economic losses.”51 The sole remedy, therefore, is in
contract law, and the court unquestionably held that the economic loss rule
in Florida applies to claims sounded in contract.

44. AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 180.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 180–81.
47. Id. at 181.
48. Id. at 180.
49. 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987).
50. Id. at 902 (stating that the economic loss rule has a “long, historic” basis in Florida).
51. AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 181–82; see also Heather Howdeshell, Note, Didn’t My
General Contractor Pay You? Subcontractor Construction Liens in Residential Construction
Projects, 61 FLA. L. REV. 151, 170 & n.140 (2009).
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B. Casa Clara Condominium Ass’n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.:
A Noteworthy Dissent
Nearly six years after AFM Corp., the Florida Supreme Court addressed
whether a homeowner could recover pure economic losses from a concrete
provider under a theory of negligence in Casa Clara Condominium
Ass’n.52 The plaintiffs owned residential units which were built with
defective concrete supplied by Toppino & Sons, Inc.53 The plaintiffs
acknowledged the state’s economic loss rule but implored the court to
create a negligence-based exception to the rule to compensate homeowners
who have suffered economic losses after a breach of contract for the
construction of their homes.54 The court again stated that contract—and not
tort—law was most appropriate for providing any available remedy.55 The
court also held that the homeowners bargained for finished products—
completed, constructed homes—and not the homes’ individual
components, such as the concrete. Because the concrete was part and
parcel of the completed home, the defective concrete caused no damage
except to the product itself.56
A prescient dissent by Florida Supreme Court Justice Leander J. Shaw,
Jr. asserted that contract law was inapplicable because the homeowners
were not parties to the contract between Toppino and the general contractor
who constructed the homes.57 Therefore, he argued, it would be imprudent
to “stretch” the economic loss rule to bar an action by an innocent third
party who had suffered a foreseeable injury at the hand of a tortfeasor.58
Justice Shaw essentially suggested shifting the economic loss rule from a
general rule for which exceptions need be sought to a concept expressly
limited to certain circumstances. This suggestion of limitation on the rule
perhaps provided the spark for several more exceptions carved out by the
Florida Supreme Court in subsequent years.
C. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. American Aviation,
Inc.: Change, but Duty Remains
In Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, the Florida Supreme
Court fell in line with Justice Shaw’s dissent and explicitly limited the
scope of the economic loss rule.59 There, an aircraft owner and its insurer
sued American Aviation for damage to the aircraft because of American
52. Casa Clara Condo. Ass’n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993).
53. Id. at 1245.
54. Id. at 1246 (arguing that contract remedies would be burdensome and unfair to
homeowners).
55. Id. at 1247 (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co., 510 So. 2d at 902).
56. Id. (applying the precedent that in a product liability claim, no recovery may be had
unless the defective product causes damage to something or someone other than itself).
57. See id. at 1249 (Shaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. Id.
59. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2004).
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Aviation’s “negligent maintenance and inspection of the aircraft’s landing
gear.”60 No privity existed between the plaintiffs and American Aviation.61
After receiving five certified questions from the Eleventh Circuit, the
Florida Supreme Court again consolidated and rephrased the questions into
a single question: “[W]hether the economic loss doctrine bars a negligence
action to recover purely economic loss in a case where the defendant is
neither a manufacturer nor distributor of a product and there is no privity of
contract.”62 The rephrasing of the question shows how the court aimed to
limit the scope of the economic loss rule in Florida.
In its first explicit limitation on the application of the rule, the court
held that the economic loss rule “bars a negligence action to recover solely
economic damages only in circumstances where the parties are either in
contractual privity or the defendant is a manufacturer or distributor of a
product.”63 Because American Aviation was not a manufacturer or
distributor of a product and no privity existed between the parties, the
economic loss rule did not bar the action.64 Until this holding, Florida’s
highest court had not explicitly established the exclusive circumstances in
which the economic loss rule remained a valid bar to a negligence claim.65
In case its holding could be interpreted in any other manner, the court
clearly stated: “We now agree that the economic loss rule should be
expressly limited.”66 The court dubbed these limited scenarios as the
“Contractual Privity Economic Loss Rule”67 and the “Products Liability
Economic Loss Rule.”68 After partitioning the rule into these two distinct
classes, the court had little difficulty finding that the facts of the case did
not fit into either.69 The court expressly overruled AFM Corp. and reasserted its opinion from a prior case where it recognized that AFM Corp.
was “unnecessarily over-expansive in [its] reliance on the economic loss
rule as opposed to fundamental contractual principles.”70
The court held that those cases that no longer fit within the scope of the
rule and its newly articulated categories “should be decided on the

60. Id. at 534.
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoted material appears in all caps in original).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 536 (“In this state, the economic loss rule has been applied in two different
circumstances. The first is when the parties are in contractual privity and one party seeks to recover
damages in tort for matters arising from the contract. The second is when there is a defect in a
product that causes damage to the product but causes no personal injury or damage to other
property.”).
66. Id. at 542.
67. Id. at 536–37.
68. Id. at 537–41.
69. Id. at 541.
70. Id. at 542 (quoting Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 981 (Fla.1999)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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traditional negligence principles of duty, breach, and proximate cause.”71
In a concurring opinion, Justice Raoul G. Cantero made a point of
emphasizing this remaining burden of establishing duty.72 To assuage
concerns of the floodgates opening wide, Justice Cantero stated that “our
limitation of the rule will not open the gates to widespread tort recovery for
purely economic losses . . . [because] plaintiffs whose cases fall outside of
the economic loss rule must still prove ‘duty, breach, and proximate
cause.’”73 The opinion further stated that when compared to the traditional
economic loss rule, “[t]he ‘duty’ prong remains a strong filter in these
cases—virtually as strong as the rule itself.”74 This decision narrowed the
scope of the economic loss rule, with the court relying on the “duty”
element of a negligence claim to prevent the Cardozian nightmare.
II. CURD V. MOSAIC FERTILIZER, LLC: DUTY EXTENDED AD INFINITUM?
A. The Majority Opinion
On September 5, 2004, nearly six years before anyone had ever heard of
the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, the Gulf of Mexico around Tampa Bay was
forever changed when a dyke burst—releasing thousands of gallons of
acidic wastewater into Hillsborough Bay.75 The Hillsborough County
Environmental Protection Commission and the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection warned the owner, Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, that
the quantity of wastewater in the pond was dangerously pushing the dyke
to its limits.76 Nonetheless, Mosaic failed to improve the condition until it
was too late. Like those suffering after the Deepwater Horizon spill, many
businesses and individuals who earned their living on Tampa Bay were
seriously damaged.77 Also like those affected by the Deepwater Horizon
spill, those who were affected by the toxic pollutants spilled by Mosaic
promptly initiated litigation.
One of the fishermen whose livelihood swam in the waters of Tampa
Bay was Howard Curd.78 Curd is the named plaintiff in a class action
brought by a broad class against Mosaic Fertilizer to recover for the
economic losses that they suffered after the spill.79 The trial court
dismissed the proposed class action, and although Florida’s Second
71. Id. at 543.
72. Id. at 544 (Cantero, J., concurring).
73. Id. (quoting majority opinion at 543).
74. Id. at 546.
75. Janet Zink et al., Acidic, Radioactive Water Spills Into Bay, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept.
6, 2004, http://www.sptimes.com/2004/09/06/Hillsborough/Acidic__radioactive_w.shtml.
76. Petitioners’ Initial Brief at 4, Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216 (No. SC081920), 2008 WL 5260712, at *4 (Fla. 2010).
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id.
79. Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216 (Fla. 2010).
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District Court of Appeal affirmed, it certified two questions to the Florida
Supreme Court as matters of great public importance.80 The first question
asked, “Does Florida recognize a common law theory under which
commercial fishermen can recover for economic losses proximately caused
by the negligent release of pollutants despite the fact that the fishermen do
not own any property damaged by the pollution?”81 In answering in the
affirmative, the Florida Supreme Court went further by identifying the
class of plaintiffs to whom Mosaic owed a duty of care as those who fell
within the foreseeable “zone of risk.”82 This precedent is striking because
in applying the malleable “zone of risk” analysis to a class which, as a
whole, was not limited to commercial fishermen, the court may have paved
the way for a plethora of future litigation.
In holding the economic loss rule inapplicable to the facts, Curd was
unremarkable.83 After all, it merely reiterated the holding in Indemnity
Insurance Co. of North America and joined the many other jurisdictions
with an explicit carve-out of the economic loss rule as applied to
commercial fishermen.84 However, in expanding duty through use of the
“zone of risk” analysis in a claim for purely economic losses, Curd
represented nothing short of a landmark extension.
If prior cases discussed duty as the lock on the floodgates, then the
Curd court turned the key. After finding traditional negligence principles
applicable to the claim, the court questioned the district court’s finding that
the defendant did not owe “an independent duty of care to protect the
fishermen’s purely economic interests—that is, their expectations of profits
from fishing for healthy fish.”85 In overturning the district court, the
Florida Supreme Court held that Mosaic did owe such a duty and that the
duty “was not shared by the public as a whole.”86 After rationalizing duty
with the concept of foreseeability, the court recognized that although duty
may arise from several sources, the catch-all category of “a duty arising
from the general facts of a case”87 encompassed “that class of cases in
which the duty arises because of a foreseeable zone of risk arising from the
acts of the defendant.”88 According to the court, it is this duty that extended
to Curd and his class.
The court found that Mosaic’s business of storing pollutants and
80. Id. at 1218–19.
81. Id. at 1218.
82. Id. at 1228.
83. See supra Section I.C (recognizing the Florida Supreme Court’s limitation of the
economic loss rule to only contract and products liability actions).
84. See infra Part III.
85. Curd, 39 So. 3d. at 1223 (quoting Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 993 So. 2d 1078, 1083
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1228 (citing Clay Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 2003)
(citing McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 503 n.2 (Fla. 1992))).
88. Id. (quoting McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503 n.2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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chemicals created an appreciable zone of risk and that Mosaic therefore
was obligated to protect those who may be exposed to the pollutants.89
Furthermore, the court held that the commercial fishermen had a “special
interest within that zone of risk, an interest not shared by the general
community.”90 To support its finding that this interest was “special,” the
court stated that the fishermen not only relied on the fish in those waters
for their livelihood, but that they were also licensed by the state to do so.91
After all of the prologue, the court held Mosaic’s actions “constituted a
tortious invasion that interfered with the special interest of the commercial
fisherman to use those public waters to earn their livelihood.”92 The court
concluded by stating, “We find this breach of duty has given rise to a cause
of action sounding in negligence.”93 After expanding the reach of the duty
element beyond the boundaries relied upon for decades as a shield against
litigation, the Curd court seemingly saw the damages element of a claim as
a sufficient hurdle to serve the same goal and act as a new shield.94
B. Justice Polston: Articulating the Potential Cardozian Nightmare
Likely due to the jurisdictional limitations inherent in certified
questions, the majority opinion focused solely on the commercial
fishermen in Curd’s class.95 However, a separate opinion written by Justice
Polston proposed that such a limited reading of the holding is perhaps
myopic. In his view, as to the specific question regarding the negligence
claim, “the majority decides the case for a more narrow class than those
bringing the suit and more narrowly than the claims they allege.”96 The true
class of plaintiffs suing Mosaic included more than merely commercial
fishermen, and their claims extended far beyond profit losses associated
with closed waterways or dead fish. The claimants included “all fishermen
and those persons engaged in the commercial catch and sale of fish,” and
their pleadings requested broad damages, including damages attributable to
the resulting harm to their reputation.97
The good justice, clearly recognizing the dangers inherent in the
majority’s extension of duty in Curd, attempted to blunt the breadth of the
89. Id. (“It was foreseeable that, were these materials released into the public waters, they
would cause damage to marine and plant life as well as to human activity.” (citing McCain, 593 So.
2d at 503 n.2)).
90. Id. (citing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 1974)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. (“[I]n order to be entitled to compensation for any loss of profits, the commercial
fishermen must prove all of the elements of their causes of action, including damages.” (emphasis
added)).
95. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b) (limiting the appellate jurisdiction of Florida’s supreme
court, including, as was the case in Curd, addressing certified questions of great public importance);
see also infra note 123.
96. Curd, 39 So. 3d. at 1229 (Polston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97. Id. (quoting Petitioner’s Fourth Amended Complaint) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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majority’s ruling. First, he opined that the majority’s decision “does not
extend to distributors, seafood restaurants, fisheries, fish brokers, or the
like whose incomes may have been affected by Mosaic’s pollution.”98
However, the majority opinion is far from explicit on this point. Second, he
made a public policy prophylactic argument that Mosaic owed a duty of
care to neither the commercial fishermen nor any of the claimants in the
class action lawsuit.99
Despite the fact that Florida effectively eviscerated the economic loss
rule in claims of negligence six years earlier,100 Justice Polston relied on
that doctrine’s underpinnings to bolster his assertion. Justice Polston
focused on the fact that, “[h]ere, the plaintiffs have suffered no personal
injury. They have suffered no property damage.”101 Justice Polston argued
that “commercial fishermen in Florida do not have a ‘special’ interest
within the ‘zone of risk’ the majority finds Mosaic to have created.”102
Specifically, the justice questioned the majority’s reliance on the licensure
of the fisherman as a basis for establishing duty.103 He stated that “if every
state-licensed Floridian has a ‘special’ or ‘unique’ interest, then it seems
there is endless ‘foreseeable’ liability.”104
Echoing the learned Judge Cardozo, Justice Polston mapped the
horizon he feared: “The unrestricted imposition of liability on polluters for
purely economic damages could create future liability ‘in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.’”105 Whether
Justice Polston is deemed to be a soothsayer or Henny Penny106 will likely
take years of litigation to ascertain.
C. The Aftermath: Curd as a Roadmap for BP Claimants
While it is possible that the majority opinion and Justice Polston’s
opinion were drafted without a thought to the impending BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill litigation, it seems unlikely at best.107 Based on the scope
of Justice Polston’s opinion, it seems as though he was addressing
98. Id.
99. See id. at 1230–34.
100. See supra Section I.C (discussing Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc.,
891 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2004)).
101. Curd, 39 So. 3d at 1232 (Polston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. Id. at 1233.
103. Id. at 1233–34.
104. Id. (“[H]otels and restaurants near the beach, seafood truck drivers, beach community
realtors, and yacht salesmen are all licensed by the State to conduct commercial activities that may
be negatively affected by pollution of coastal waters.”).
105. Id. at 1232 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)).
106. Henny Penny, also known as Chicken Little, is a fable about a chicken who believes the
world is coming to an end. It is a common idiom indicating a hysterical or mistaken belief that
disaster is imminent. See, e.g., STEVEN KELLOGG, CHICKEN LITTLE (1985).
107. At the time the Curd opinion was handed down, the BP spill had been going on for over
fifty-eight days and was at the forefront of almost all news coverage, especially in Gulf states,
including Florida.
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concerns that spread far beyond the small group affected by Mosaic and the
small area of Tampa Bay at issue in Curd. His focus was on the state of
Florida as a whole and the “tens of thousands of Floridians who earn their
living from healthy ocean waters”108 and via beach tourism across the
state.109 Looking ahead—and, perhaps, toward the Gulf—Polston saw the
rising tide of litigation that would result if Curd is read to extend duty too
far and too wide.
Despite Justice Polston’s protestations, following Curd, litigants
claiming damages due to the BP oil spill could easily illustrate that
commercial fishermen have a common law negligence action against
polluters in Florida for pure economic losses. Equally true, although
abhorrent to the justice’s view of jurisprudence, is that Curd’s legal
rationale could be adapted by plaintiffs’ attorneys to support the conclusion
that polluters also owe a duty of care to hotels, restaurants, tourism
industries, theme parks, or other tertiary plaintiffs who fall with the
“foreseeable zone of risk.” In any litigation stemming from the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, this would be almost as simple as substituting the party
names and a few facts and then following the roadmap to liability provided
in the majority opinion.
First, a plaintiff in BP litigation could establish that BP, like Mosaic
Fertilizer, “created an appreciable zone of risk” and was therefore
“required to exercise prudent foresight whenever others may be injured as
a result.”110 Second, a plaintiff could establish that BP’s duty, like Mosaic
Fertilizer’s duty, “ar[ose] because of a foreseeable zone of risk arising
from” BP’s actions.111 Therefore, like in Mosaic Fertilizer, BP’s “activities
created an appreciable zone of risk within which [BP] was obligated to
protect those who were exposed to harm.”112 Third, it is not a reach to state
that, like Mosaic Fertilizer, BP’s “business involved the storage [and
excavation] of pollutants and hazardous contaminants.”113 Fourth, it was
similarly foreseeable that, were these materials released into the public
waters, “they would cause damage to marine and plant life as well as to
human activity.”114 Fifth, these tertiary plaintiffs could establish that they
“had a special interest within that zone of risk, an interest not shared by the
108. Curd, 39 So. 3d at 1233 (Polston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Id. (citing CTR. FOR URBAN & ENVTL. SOLUTIONS AT FLA. ATL. UNIV., FLORIDA VISITOR
STUDY 1 (2008); Forrest J. Bass, Calming the Storm: Public Access to Florida’s Beaches in the
Wake of Hurricane-Related Sand Loss, 38 STETSON L. REV. 541, 570–71 (2009)).
110. Id. at 1228 (majority opinion) (quoting McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 503
(Fla. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. (quoting McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503 n.2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id. The oil sludge from the BP spill contains a bevy of toxins that could include elevated
levels of polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (or PAHs), which could be carcinogenic. See Joshua
Philipp, BP Oil Spill Taking Toll on Louisiana Indian Tribe, EPOCH TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010,
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/45131/.
114. Curd, 39 So. 3d at 1228 (citing McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503 n.2) (emphasis added).
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general community.”115
Hotels and resorts, much like commercial fishermen, are licensed and
heavily regulated by the state of Florida.116 While the vast majority of such
tertiary plaintiffs are not licensed “to conduct commercial activities in the
waters” of the state, as were fishermen in Curd,117 many certainly conduct
activities along or near those waters and, like the Curd fishermen, “[are]
dependent on those waters to earn their livelihood.”118
Finally, like Mosaic Fertilizer, BP’s “activities placed the [tertiary
plaintiff’s] peculiar interests directly within the zone of risk created by”119
BP’s activities. “As a result, [BP] was obligated to exercise prudent
foresight and take sufficient precautions to protect that interest.”120
Therefore, a well-plead claim with Curd as binding precedent would leave
no other alternative than to conclude that BP owed hotels, restaurants, and
other similarly situated plaintiffs a duty of care for pure economic losses
arising from the BP oil spill.
This is not to say that such an argument is unassailable. To be certain,
many high-priced law firms may gladly fill many a billable hour
pontificating on just how “peculiar” a plaintiff’s interests must be to be
worthy of such a duty of care. But Curd presents a far more pressing
problem for the judiciary. Even assuming, arguendo, that the herd would
be thinned by plaintiffs unable to establish proper damages, the liberalizing
of the duty requirement will, at a minimum, give fresh sets of keys to the
courthouse doors to litigants. Simply put, cases which would have
previously been dismissed at the early stages of litigation for failure to state
a cause of action on an element based on the law (i.e., the existence of a
duty) will now be required to see a jury to decide those issues based on the
facts (i.e., proximate causation and damages). These practical changes in
litigation posture will provide leverage to plaintiffs and increase the
pressure on wealthy defendants to settle.
Given the implications of its decision to even expound on the common
law duty issue, it seems unfathomable that the learned justices of the
Florida Supreme Court failed to pay it any consideration. Certainly, the
court simply could have found a statutory cause of action (which they
unanimously did) and held that this obviated the need to address the
common law liability. The court has employed this method of judicial
avoidance in many cases, and it would have been a far more prudent
115. Id. (citing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 1974)).
116. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.241 (West 2010) (requiring, under criminal penalty, the
licensure of hotels and restaurants by the state of Florida).
117. Curd, 39 So. 3d at 1228 (emphasis added).
118. Id. The Florida Supreme Court would be injudicious to base its distinction between the
commercial fishermen in Curd and such tertiary plaintiffs solely on the fact that the tertiary
plaintiffs’ businesses are situated in the waters rather than alongside the waters.
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 735 (Fla. 1989)).
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posture to take in Curd.121 This would hardly have affected the claims,
since the broad damages permitted under Florida Statutes § 376.313
include “all damages resulting from a discharge or other condition of
pollution” covered by further statutes.122
As stated above, due to the jurisdictional constraints in Florida’s
constitution,123 the court was restricted to answering the specific question
asked about claims of commercial fishermen. Because Florida’s Second
District Court of Appeal did not ask, the Supreme Court could not opine on
whether Mosaic owed a duty of care for the pure economic damages of
non-commercial fishermen or any other tertiary plaintiffs for that matter.
However, there is a fine line between obeying the constitutional limitations
and treading in waters that could have been easily traversed.
Another foreseeable effect of this decision is that the Florida Supreme
Court cannot, sua sponte, grant certiorari to rehear this matter. The
precedent is set and is now wholly binding in Florida. At issue is the
freedom of lower courts to limit its application specifically to commercial
fishermen or expand it to tertiary plaintiffs. It will take either varied
application of the precedent by, and unequal justice in, the lower courts
(conflict jurisdiction) or another district court of appeal certifying an “on
all fours” question for the Florida Supreme Court to ever again address this
issue. Hence, the question of just how far duty will extend in these cases
remains open and will likely take years of litigation before being answered.
Whether or not liability proves to be extended in a way that Justice Polston
suggested, one incontrovertible result of the Curd decision is that potential
claimants asserting purely economic losses as a result of the BP oil spill
now seem to have sounder footing for their negligence-based claims in the
courts of the state of Florida. Therefore, if venue can be established, this
decision appears to signal a green light to BP claimants who want to try
their luck under Florida law.

121. See, e.g., Raborn v. Menotte, 974 So. 2d 328, 332 (Fla. 2008) (“Having answered this
first question, we decline to answer the second certified question as it is moot.”); T.M. v. State, 784
So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 2001) (“Because the district court applied heightened rather than strict
scrutiny we remand this case for further consideration. We decline to address the remaining issues
raised by the parties.”); J.A. v. State, 788 So. 2d 953, 954 (Fla. 2001) (citing T.M. in declining
second question); Fawcett v. State, 615 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1993) (“We find the first certified
question irrelevant and moot in light of our disposition of the second question, and we thus decline
to answer it.”).
122. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.313(3) (West 2011) (emphasis added).
123. For instance, Florida’s high court does not have certiorari powers akin to the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Haines City Comm. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 525 n.2 (Fla. 1995).
Instead, the court may hear matters only as specifically delineated in its state’s constitution. FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 3(b). In Curd, the Florida Supreme Court had jurisdiction because a lower
appellate court presented it with a question of great public importance. Curd, 39 So. 3d at 1218; see
also FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
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III. VENUE SHOPPING: COMPARING THE PROSPECTS FOR POTENTIAL BP
CLAIMANTS ACROSS THE AFFECTED GULF STATES
The Gulf states directly affected by the BP oil spill—Alabama,
Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, and Florida—and their federal circuits—the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits—take varied approaches to the economic loss
rule, especially in the contexts likely to arise in BP litigation. Florida’s
Curd opinion overwhelmingly represents a break from its fellow Gulf
states, liberally opening the door for claims that heretofore would not have
survived summary judgment. Regardless, variations among these states’
and circuits’ common law principles could dramatically affect who is
compensated and for what injuries in BP litigation. The following analysis
attempts the first comprehensive review of the Gulf states’ adherence to
the economic loss rule vis-à-vis contexts similar to the current oil spill.
A. Eleventh Circuit
Florida’s federal circuit has taken a much more conservative approach
to the economic loss rule than the Florida Supreme Court. For nearly three
decades, the Eleventh Circuit steadfastly has held to the economic loss rule
with the exception for commercial fishermen.
In Kingston Shipping Co. v. Roberts, 124 the new Eleventh Circuit125
adopted with little discussion the Robins rule, limiting recovery in tort to
only those instances of injury or damage to property.126 In Kingston, a main
ship channel in Tampa Bay was closed for nearly a month after a ship
collided with a U.S. Coast Guard buoy tender, sinking the latter in the
waterway.127 Delayed vessels sought damages as a result of the holdups in
entering or leaving the port of Tampa.128 In affirming the district court’s
ruling, the Eleventh Circuit held that the vessels failed to state a cause of
action, noting that “a party may not recover economic losses not associated
with physical damages.”129 The court held the same in a subsequent case
involving blockage of the Tampa Bay port.130
The next year, the court recognized a small exception to the economic
loss rule. In Miller Industries v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,131 a manufacturer
sold the plaintiff ship owner a faulty engine that caused the ship to stall at
sea, delaying its scheduled trip.132 Although the case stemmed from a
124. 667 F.2d 34 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
125. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2,
94 Stat. 1994, 1994 (creating the Eleventh Circuit by splitting the Fifth Circuit).
126. Kingston, 667 F.2d at 35 (citing Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303
(1927)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Florida, 720 F.2d 1201, 1202 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
131. 733 F.2d 813 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
132. Id. at 815–16.
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products liability claim, the district court awarded and the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed damages sounding in tort, namely, lost profits of uncaptured fish
of its crew members who intervened in the case despite not being in privity
of contract with the defendant.133
Citing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s Union Oil Co.
v. Oppen decision, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a commercial fishermen
exception to the economic loss rule.134 A key rationale for the court’s
decision was that the injury to commercial fishermen—who make their
living from and are trained in the enterprise of catching fish—from such a
tortious act was “neither remote nor a speculative injury.”135 Furthermore,
these plaintiffs were not the sort that would be unknown to the tortfeasor,
as injury to their ability to catch fish would be a foreseeable harm of such
tortious activity.136 In essence, the court held that the justifications for
limiting pure economic losses to preclude an indeterminate class for an
indeterminate time did not apply to commercial fishermen, who would be
foreseeable victims of such tortious activity. In the BP context, it is likely
that the Eleventh Circuit also would find a commercial fishermen
exception, allowing recovery for demonstrated economic damages
associated with the spill as those injuries would be just as foreseeable as
the fishermen in Miller Industries, if not more. With respect to more
remote or speculative damages to restaurants or hotels, however, those
injuries would likely not qualify for the exception in this circuit. Since its
early cases, the Eleventh Circuit has not demonstrated any move away
from the Robins rule in this respect or from the limited commercial
fishermen exception.
B. Alabama
The state with the least amount of coastline affected by the BP oil
spill,137 Alabama, also has the fewest court decisions analyzing the
economic loss rule in this or similar contexts. Alabama state courts have
cited Robins only once138 and have never considered the Ninth Circuit’s
application of the commercial fishermen exception in published
opinions.139 Alabama state decisions and commentary140 support the
133. Id. at 816, 818, 823.
134. Id. at 819–20 (citing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 567 (9th Cir. 1974)).
135. Id. at 820.
136. Id.
137. All Things Considered: Notable Numbers from the Gulf Oil Spill (NPR radio broadcast
Aug. 3, 2010), available at 2010 WLNR 15436369.
138. This analysis was based on a Westlaw Keycite search in May 2011. The single Alabama
state court case discussing or even citing to Robins was Ziegler v. Blount Bros. Construction Co.,
364 So. 2d 1163, 1166–67 (Ala. 1978).
139. This analysis was based on a Westlaw Keycite search in November 2010.
140. See, e.g., Commentary, Recovery of Economic Damages Under the Alabama Extended
Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine, 35 ALA. L. REV. 329, 346 (1984) (“[W]hat would the court’s
view on recovery of economic damages likely be? Because the court continues to retain the
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conclusion that Alabama is likely to apply stringently the economic loss
rule to BP litigation claims.
In Ziegler v. Blount Bros. Construction Co., the Alabama Supreme
Court essentially applied the principles of the economic loss rule when
residents of a town sought economic damages against a contractor for its
tortious construction of the Walter Bouldin Dam.141 The town’s residents
claimed, under theories of third-party beneficiary and negligence, that the
defendant should have known its tortious conduct in constructing a dam
that later collapsed would lead to increases in their utility costs.142 First,
regarding the third-party beneficiary theory, the court found that the
purpose of the contract for the dam’s construction was not to benefit the
town’s residents who would consume the additional electricity.143 Instead,
the residents were merely “incidental beneficiaries who claim the loss of an
economic benefit.”144 More importantly, the court held that the defendant
owed the plaintiffs no duty of care for their pure economic losses. In sum,
the court reasoned that it was remote and not “reasonably foreseeable” that
errors in construction of the dam would lead to the state’s implementation
of a rate-increasing clause to obtain electricity from another source.145
This result and results in Alabama products liability claims146 illustrate
that Alabama holds firm to the economic loss rule. Whether an exception
for commercial fishermen under the economic loss rule exists in this state
remains unclear. However, based on its strict adherence to the rule in the
Bouldin Dam case and little sign of retreat since then, the Alabama
Supreme Court certainly has a much less liberal view of the economic loss
doctrine than the Florida Supreme Court. If residents were not the intended
beneficiaries of the contract designed to provide them with electricity, then
certainly charter boats, beach vendors, hotels, resorts, or amusement parks
would not qualify as intended beneficiaries of any contractual or tort duty
of BP to drill in a non-negligent manner.
C. Fifth Circuit
The circuit likely to field many of the BP claims is the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, whose jurisdiction includes Mississippi,
Louisiana, and Texas. The “Oil Circuit” may prove to be the most perilous
for plaintiffs bringing claims against BP arising from the Deepwater
Horizon spill.147 Unlike the Ninth and other circuits, the Fifth Circuit has
distinction between recovery in tort and recovery in contract, it is unlikely that the court would
undercut the provisions of contract law in favor of recovery in tort.”).
141. Ziegler, 364 So. 2d at 1164–65.
142. Id. at 1165, 1167.
143. Id. at 1166.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1167–68.
146. See, e.g., Lloyd Wood Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 543 So. 2d 671, 672 (Ala. 1989).
147. See Michael Kunzelman, New Orleans Judge to Handle Most Gulf Oil Spill Lawsuits,
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adhered religiously to the economic loss rule, providing no true exception
for commercial fishermen despite repeated opportunities to revisit its
holding.
Although many—even BP—argue that the Fifth Circuit recognizes the
commercial fishermen exception to the rule barring damages for economic
losses absent a physical injury,148 a close reading of circuit decisions
suggests otherwise. The genesis of this misperception is Louisiana ex rel.
William J. Guste v. M/V Testbank (M/V Testbank I).149 Two vessels
collided near the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, dropping twelve tons of a
highly toxic chemical—pentaclorophenol (PCP)—into the waterway while
drums of hydrobromic acid and ethyl mercaptan were lost overboard or
ruptured.150 As a result, the U.S. Coast Guard shut off portions of
Louisiana waterways and marshes to commercial fishermen.151 The
plaintiffs sued the vessel owners under numerous theories, including
maritime tort.152
The district court judge noted the Fifth Circuit’s “steadfast” adherence
to the economic loss rule before rejecting its application to commercial
fishermen.153 The judge relied primarily on similar exceptions carved out
by other jurisdictions that held that commercial fishermen had a special
interest that the tortious defendants had a duty not to harm negligently.154
In sum, the judge noted that the defendants caused “a tortious invasion that
interfered with the special interest of the commercial fishermen, crabbers,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 10, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 16307871 (noting that the U.S.
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered a Louisiana judge to hear seventy-seven cases and
potentially 200 related claims). The panel wrote, “Without discounting the spill’s effects on other
states, if there is a geographic and psychological ‘center of gravity’ in this docket, then the Eastern
District of Louisiana is closest to it,” according to the Associated Press. Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Furthermore, regardless of whether it actually interferes with judicial independence,
it is noteworthy that media reports have repeatedly documented the Fifth Circuit’s ties to Big Oil.
Id. (reporting that only four New Orleans-based judges could hear the case because others have
recused themselves partially due to their “oil and gas industry investments” and that another judge
owned corporate bonds issued by two of the BP defendants); see also Rebecca Mowbray, Drilling
Ban in Standoff; Case Will Return to Court This Morning, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.),
June 24, 2010, at A08, available at 2010 WLNR 12815655 (placing the number of New Orleans
judges who recused themselves at seven out of twelve district court judges); ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE,
JUDICIAL GUSHER: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S TIES TO OIL 8–9 (2010), available at www.afj.org/aboutafj/press/fifth_circuit_ judges_report.pdf (documenting alleged investments and ties to oil of Fifth
Circuit judges).
148. See, e.g., BP Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 24, Marine Horizons, Inc. v. BP PLC, No. 1:10-cv-00227-WS-N (S.D. Ala.
July 12, 2010), 2010 WL 2771473 (discussing “one very narrow exception to the Robins Dry Dock
rule”).
149. La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank (M/V Testbank I), 524 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. La. 1981).
150. Id. at 1171 & n.1.
151. Id. at 1171.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1172, 1174.
154. Id. at 1173 (citing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Burgess v. M/V
Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Me. 1973); Masonite Corp. v. Steede, 23 So. 2d 756 (Miss. 1945)
(en banc); Hampton v. N.C. Pulp Co., 27 S.E.2d 538 (1943)).
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shrimpers and oystermen to use those public waters to earn their
livelihood.”155 Accordingly, when the judge granted summary judgment
against the plaintiffs seeking relief for economic damages not associated
with a physical injury or contract, the judge did not include “commercial
fishermen, oystermen, crabbers and shrimpers” who routinely operated on
the closed waterways as defined by the Coast Guard. This allowed
commercial fishermen, but not the other plaintiffs, to continue in the
litigation.156
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion
twice—in a per curiam decision (M/V Testbank II)157 and an en banc ruling
(M/V Testbank III).158 Importantly, these appeals concerned the district
court’s grant of summary judgment against the non-fishermen plaintiffs in
M/V Testbank I.159 Therefore, M/V Testbank II and M/V Testbank III did
not pass judgment on or endorse the commercial fishermen exception in
M/V Testbank I made by a lone district court judge. Moreover, the rationale
of the en banc Fifth Circuit decision strongly indicates that even the claims
of the commercial fishermen must yield to the economic loss rule.
Sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its endorsement of the
economic loss rule on the grounds that anything less than a categorical bar
to recovering economic losses absent damages to the plaintiff’s person or
property would be unworkable. “Ultimately we conclude that without this
limitation foreseeability loses much of its ability to function as a rule of
law.”160 The rule “is a pragmatic limitation on the doctrine of
foreseeability, a limitation we find to be both workable and useful.”161 The
court went on: “The explanation . . . is a pragmatic one: the physical
consequences of negligence usually have been limited, but the indirect
economic repercussions of negligence may be far wider, indeed virtually
open-ended.”162 “[W]e disagree with a case-by-case approach because we
think the value of a rule is significant in these maritime decisions.”163 In
addition, the court refused to recognize a public nuisance exception to sue
polluters because of the “problem” in “determining which foreseeable
damages are too remote to justify recovery in negligence.”164
155. Id. at 1174.
156. Id.
157. La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank (M/V Testbank II), 728 F.2d 748, 750 (5th Cir. 1984)
(per curiam).
158. La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank (M/V Testbank III), 752 F.2d 1019, 1032 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc).
159. Id. at 1021 n.2 (“The rights of commercial fishermen who survived summary judgment
are not before us.”).
160. Id. at 1021.
161. Id. at 1032.
162. Id. at 1022 (quoting Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss
Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 45 (1972)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
163. Id. at 1026.
164. Id. at 1030.
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Recognizing a commercial fishermen exception would introduce the
same unpredictability in the stream of liability and application of tort
concepts, such as foreseeability, that the Fifth Circuit sought to extract in
M/V Testbank III. To illustrate, even limiting the class of plaintiffs excused
from the economic loss rule to commercial fishermen proves troublesome
under that rationale: Who will qualify as a “commercial fishermen”? For
how long must those plaintiffs have used affected waterways for the
defendants to have owed them a duty of care? Which damages of the
commercial fishermen would be covered? And for how long can
commercial fishermen recover for dead fish even after they are physically
able to return to the seas?165
Clearly, though, the Fifth Circuit was not in unison in excluding the
commercial fishermen claims. The court noted a “substantial argument can
be made” that commercial fishermen have a proprietary interest in fish that
would effectively save those plaintiffs from the rule’s administration.166
Alternatively, the court noted its decision would sidestep extending the
Ninth Circuit’s commercial fishermen exception adopted in M/V Testbank
I.167 In fact, two of the judges concurring in the judgment demonstrated at
most a sympathy for the commercial fishermen or at least an unwillingness
to close the rule to any exceptions.168 Still, another concurring judge noted
the infeasibility of the courts to administer a non-categorical rule.169
Moreover, even the dissent acknowledged that notwithstanding the
majority’s supposed reservations in the breadth of its ruling, M/V Testbank
III was contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s exception for commercial
fishermen.170 Ultimately, though, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “today’s
decision does not foreclose free consideration by a court panel of the
claims of commercial fishermen.”171
But in the twenty-five years since M/V Testbank III, the Fifth Circuit
has yet to recognize such an exception.172 In fact, in 2006 the Fifth Circuit
165. See infra text accompanying notes 213–15 (discussing Texas rule that limits damages of
commercial fishermen to the period in which they were denied the opportunity to fish rather than
allowing a claim for feral fish otherwise uncaught).
166. M/V Testbank III, 752 F.2d at 1027 n.10.
167. Id. (referencing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974)).
168. Id. at 1034 (Williams, J., concurring) (“The commercial fishermen properly recover
because their livelihood comes from a ‘resource’ of the water which was polluted. Yet, physical
property owned by them was not damaged and it is doubtful that a proprietary interest could have
been shown.”); see also id. at 1035 (Garwood, J., concurring) (“I am in full accord with the
desirability of a general rule in accordance with the principles stated by [the en banc decision], and
for the reasons . . . articulate[d]. However, we need not in this case either foreclose, or define the
precise contours of, possible rare exceptions.”).
169. Id. at 1032–34 (Gee, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 1043 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 1027 (en banc).
172. However, similar to the varied decisions of the M/V Testbank III judges, views on the
exception for commercial fishermen have not been uniform within the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction.
See Shaughnessy v. PPG Indus., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 193, 196 (W.D. La. 1992); see also Tamara
Dixon, Note, Recovery of Economic Loss Absent Physical Damage to a Proprietary Interest: Does
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overturned its lower court’s adoption of an exception and added: “While
other jurisdictions may have abandoned or relaxed the bright line rule of
Robins and TESTBANK, this circuit has not retreated from TESTBANK’s
physical injury requirement . . . .”173 There, claimants brought an action
against a barge owner whose vessel crashed into a bridge and released a
toxic gas that resulted in the evacuation of businesses and residents.174
While dismissing the district court’s commercial fishermen exception on
technical grounds,175 the Fifth Circuit noted that M/V Testbank III
dismissed a “case-by-case approach” to unintentional maritime torts, and
the court reiterated its commitment to the economic loss rule.176
Granted, the waters are murky on whether the Fifth Circuit would
uphold a commercial fishermen exception in BP lawsuits, although that
question may not even make it to the circuit’s docket.177 On the larger
issue, though, the Fifth Circuit likely will not sustain claims from periphery
plaintiffs whose alleged non-proprietary damages due to the BP oil spill are
too remote to deserve compensation under maritime law.
An important caveat to the Fifth Circuit jurisprudence should be noted.
Prior to the Testbank rulings, in at least two instances, Fifth Circuit courts
ruled in favor of plaintiffs where no physical damage to their property
actually occurred.178 In J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. S.S. Egero,179 the Fifth
Circuit found that the plaintiff-contractor was the “owner” of a pipeline
project that was delayed due to the defendant-shipper’s misplaced
anchor.180 Also, a federal district court in Louisiana ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs in a case in which the defendant-shipper caused them additional
expenses due to the defendant’s collision with canal locks that blocked
Testbank Dim the Bright-Line?, 46 LA. L. REV. 913, 921 (1986) (“In contrast, the policy issues
behind Testbank and Union Oil seem to support recognizing the claims of commercial fishermen
and imposing liability on the defendants.”). In Shaughnessy, the court applied a commercial
fishermen exception to a fishing and hunting guide business that suffered losses due to pollution of
Louisiana waters. Shaughnessy, 795 F. Supp. at 194, 196–97. However, the court found that the
case was distinguishable from the Testbank decisions as it was based on a land-based tort—not a
maritime tort. Id. at 196.
173. In re Taira Lynn Marine Ltd. No. 5, LLC, 444 F.3d 371, 379 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (overruling a district court’s decision that plaintiffs qualified for a
“commercial fishermen” exception to the Testbank rule based on the grounds that the claims were
not properly included in a motion for summary judgment). The court’s decision here appears
spurious. In essence, the court rules against the commercial fishermen, refusing to apply the
supposed M/V Testbank I exception, because in their application for a grant of summary judgment,
the plaintiffs claimed that they were “wholesale fishermen,” not “commercial fishermen.” Id.
174. Id. at 375–76.
175. See supra note 173.
176. In re Taira Lynn Marine Ltd., 444 F.3d at 378–79.
177. Mary Foster, $20 Billion Oil Fund to Begin Payments in August, ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN.
WIRE, July 15, 2010 (noting BP’s creation of a $20 billion fund to compensate claimants alleging
losses due to the BP oil spill and the potential large settlements with commercial fishermen).
178. Dixon, supra note 172, at 918–20.
179. 453 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1972).
180. Id. at 1203–04.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 5 [2011], Art. 5

1268

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

navigable waterways.181 These cases, however, likely would not be
persuasive in undoing the Testbank tenets. Both cases were ignored by the
majority in M/V Testbank III while cited approvingly by the dissent.182 M/V
Testbank III likely rendered the decisions devoid of any jurisprudential
value. A Fifth District appeals or district court has referenced S.S. Ergo in
only one case183 since M/V Testbank III and has not cited the other district
court case. Moreover, neither court in those pre-M/V Testbank decisions
allowed recovery for lost profits,184 which would be at the heart of any
damage claims by the periphery plaintiffs in BP lawsuits. Looking at the
Fifth Circuit rules in a vacuum is not desirable. In fact, individual state
laws and preferences inform the Testbank rule, leading to variation in
recognition of rights to economic losses among commercial fishermen and
other plaintiffs.
D. Louisiana
Although the leading Fifth Circuit decision on the economic loss rule
bubbled up from its borders, Louisiana state courts have broken with the
per se economic loss rule in lieu of a duty-risk analysis.185 Yet, due to the
stringent application of the analysis as well as additional common law
restrictions, Louisiana state law still would provide little solace to private
BP plaintiffs, including commercial fishermen. Unsurprisingly, in its
multistate defense, BP argued that if any state’s laws were applicable to oil
spill claims, they were Louisiana’s, regardless of where the plaintiff’s
injuries occurred.186
In one case in which a tortfeasor’s negligent act deprived a plaintiff of
the benefits of its contract, the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to permit
the recovery of pure economic loss that the court suggested could have
resulted in damages “in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time
to an indeterminate class.”187 In PPG Industries, Inc. v. Dean Dredging, a
dredging contractor working on Louisiana’s Calcasieu River damaged a

181. In re Lyra Shipping Co., Ltd., 360 F. Supp. 1188, 1189, 1191–92 (E.D. La. 1973).
182. La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1020–32 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc); id.
at 1041 & n.15 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
183. Tex. E. Transmission Corp. v. McMoRan Offshore Exploration Co., 877 F.2d 1214 (5th
Cir. 1989).
184. S.S. Egero, 453 F.2d at 1204; Lyra Shipping, 360 F. Supp. at 1192.
185. Shelly F. Spansel, Comment, Robins Dry Dock Versus State Laws Governing Liability for
Pure Economic Loss: How the Maritime Circuit Should Resolve the Preemption Conflict, 51 LOY.
L. REV. 165, 172 (2005).
186. See, e.g., BP Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint at 21 n.5, Marine Horizons, Inc. v. BP PLC, No. 1:10-cv-00227-WS-N (S.D.
Ala. July 12, 2010), 2010 WL 2771473 (“Thus, the State of Louisiana is adjacent to the accident
site, and its laws may govern certain claims arising from the incident absent applicable federal law
or any inconsistencies between Louisiana law and federal law.”).
187. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Dean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058, 1061 (La. 1984) (quoting
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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natural gas line owned by Texaco.188 The plaintiff in the case was not
Texaco or a subsidiary but a third party who relied on the gas line to run its
manufacturing plant, PPG Industries.189 Due to the gas line damage, the
plaintiff bought natural gas from another source and at a higher price and
later filed suit against the dredger.190
Although repeatedly acknowledging that the defendant-dredger acted
“negligently,” the court found that “[r]ules of conduct are designed to
protect some persons under some circumstances against some risks.”191 In
adopting a case-by-case, duty-risk analysis, Louisiana’s high court looked
to policy considerations and at the “ease of association between the rule of
conduct, the risk of injury, and the loss sought to be recovered.”192 While
the court acknowledged an ease of association between the rule not to
negligently damage another’s property and the damage to Texaco’s
pipeline, the court found no similar association between that rule and
protecting a third party’s contract interest in the damaged property.193
Therefore, the court ruled against the plaintiff.
PPG Industries, Inc. is profound not for its holding but for its
abandonment of a per se bar on pure economic loss.194 The fact that the
court found the plaintiff’s contract interest in the damaged property too
remote to deserve protection is an indicator that plaintiffs alleging
economic losses in their tourism or restaurant industries due to
environmental damage from BP’s oil spill also will fail the duty-risk
analysis. In fact, post-PPG Industries, Inc., Louisiana state courts have
been reluctant to recognize pure economic losses—including those of
commercial fishermen—unlike other Gulf states.195
In Phillips v. G&H Seed Co.,196 a Louisiana appeals court overturned a
jury verdict in favor of crawfish purchasers and processors after the
defendants coated their food with a product that killed or sterilized the
crustaceans.197 The defendants settled with the crawfish farmers, but not
188. Id. at 1060.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1061. But see Maddox v. Int’l Paper Co., 47 F. Supp. 829, 831 (W.D. La. 1942)
(holding that “future profits from a business, reduced or destroyed by the act of another, are
allowable”).
192. PPG Indus., Inc., 447 So. 2d at 1061.
193. Id.
194. Rebecca L. Lear, Comment, Negligent Interference with Contract—An Argument Against
Categorical Rejection: Applying a Duty/Risk Analysis to Negligent Drug Testing, 60 LA. L. REV.
855, 860 (2000). But see TS & C Investments, L.L.C. v. Beusa Energy, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 370,
374–75 (W.D. La. 2009) (“Both the Louisiana Supreme Court and the federal Fifth Circuit have
adopted the Robins Dry Dock rule in the context of an unintentional maritime tort.”). Although the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s PPG Industries, Inc. holding fell in line with the economic loss rule, the
court clearly applied a duty-risk analysis in deciding the case. PPG Industries, Inc., 447 So. 2d at
1061.
195. See Lear, supra note 194, at 860.
196. 10 So. 3d 339 (La. App. 2009).
197. Id. at 344.
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with plaintiffs under contract to purchase the farmers’ crawfish.198 The
purchasers and processors then brought a products liability action against
the defendants for harming the crawfish industry.199
Although the trial judge found that “the economic damages to the entire
crawfish industry in general and these plaintiffs in particular was
foreseeable consequence [sic] of the damage to the crawfish crop caused
by [the defendant’s] negligence,” the appeals court, citing nearly the entire
holding of PPG Industries, Inc., ruled otherwise.200 As in PPG Industries,
Inc., the court found that the plaintiffs’ lack of a property interest in the
damaged entity—here, the crawfish—necessitated a finding that the
plaintiff stated no cause of action.201 The court found that the damaged
crawfish were the property of the farmers—not the plaintiff-purchasers.202
A common strain in Phillips and other Louisiana opinions that will
likely be determinative in claims of commercial fishermen against BP is
the denial of a private property interest in natural resources or wildlife. As
noted in Barasich v. Shell Pipeline Co.,203 local statutory and constitutional
provisions cut against private plaintiffs claiming ownership over public
resources.204 For instance, commercial fishermen lost their tort claim for
lack of such a proprietary interest in wild crawfish when the defendants’
dredging and oil and gas exploration activities allegedly destroyed the
aquatic ecosystem, greatly diminishing the crustaceans.205 Furthermore, the
Louisiana court of appeals held in the same case that state-endorsed fishing
licenses do not grant commercial fishermen the requisite proprietary

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 341.
Id. at 340–41.
Id. at 342, 344.
Id. at 344.
Id.
No. 05-4180, 2006 WL 3913403 (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2006).
Id. at *5, *7–8.
The ownership and title to all wild birds, and wild quadrupeds, fish, other aquatic
life, the beds and bottoms of rivers, streams, bayous, lagoons, lakes, bays, sounds,
and inlets bordering on or connecting with the Gulf of Mexico within the territory
or jurisdiction of the state, including all oysters and other shellfish and parts
thereof grown thereon, either naturally or cultivated, and all oysters in the shells
after they are caught or taken therefrom, are and remain the property of the state,
and shall be under the exclusive control of the Wildlife and Fisheries
Commission . . . .

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:3(A) (West 2011). “The control and supervision of the wildlife of the
state, including all aquatic life, is vested in the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Commission.” LA.
CONST. art. IX, § 7(A). Louisiana courts also have recognized the state’s constitution created a
public trust for the protection and conservation of its natural resources. See, e.g., Save Ourselves,
Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (La. 1984) (citing LA. CONST. art. IX, §
1).
205. La. Crawfish Producers Ass’n-W. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 935 So. 2d 380, 381, 384–85
(La. App. 2006).
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interest to state a cause of action.206 This finding is directly at odds with the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Curd, where the mere licensure of
commercial fishermen seemed enough in and of itself to grant that class a
legally cognizable cause of action against polluters.207
Likewise, in Dempster v. Louis Eymard Towing Co., plaintiffs claiming
the defendants were responsible for the loss of a fishing site also failed to
state a cause of action.208 There, the defendants’ barges collided on the
Mississippi River, scattering debris and ruining a fishing site that the
plaintiffs had relied on for years.209 Still, the court held that the fishermen
had “no proprietary interest in the fishing site or in anticipated fish caught
in the future.”210 This judicial reluctance to recognize special protections
for commercial fisherman is a harbinger of defeat for other possible BP
plaintiffs. For instance, resorts or hotels that rely on pristine beaches and
waters would likely fail to state a statutory claim under Louisiana tort law
under these holdings. First, Louisiana courts could easily determine that no
ease of association exists between laws prohibiting polluting public waters
and a hotel’s expectation losses, as the purpose of pollution rules is to
protect the state’s natural resources, not a plaintiff’s profits. Secondly,
following the Phillips-Barisch-Dempster line of cases, the court would
likely summarily hold that since the plaintiffs had no property interest in
the public’s beaches and waters, no cause of action existed, despite the
required duty-risk analysis in PPG Industries, Inc.211
E. Texas
Texas federal courts follow the traditional M/V Testbank precedent
developed by Louisiana federal courts: denying pure economic losses with
an exception for commercial fishermen. However, relying on state law, the
Texas federal courts will deny that exception to fishermen who are either
not licensed by the state or whose losses are not associated with stategranted licenses; thus, Texas limits the pool of “commercial fishermen”
who may recover for pollution-related damages and the types of damages
for which they may recover.212 With respect to both commercial fishermen
206. Id. In essence, the court found that the state’s grant of a fishing license is not akin to a
landowner’s grant of a subsidiary proprietary interest. Instead, the license is a privilege the state
grants pursuant to its regulatory powers. Id.
207. See supra Section II.A.
208. Dempster v. Louis Eymard Towing Co., 503 So. 2d 99, 100 (La. App. 1987).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 102.
211. A notable exception to this line of cases is where defendants damaged oyster beds that
Louisiana leased to plaintiffs. There, the courts have recognized a cognizable property interest to
which the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care not to negligently harm the leasehold. See,
e.g., Jurisich v. La. S. Oil & Gas Co., 284 So. 2d 173, 178 (La. App. 1973). Therefore, to the extent
BP’s oil damages resorts’ or hotels’ private beaches or other property, a Louisiana court could
conceivably find in favor of those plaintiff-owners.
212. See, e.g., Golnoy Barge Co. v. M/T Shinoussa, 841 F. Supp. 783, 785 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
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and other potential plaintiffs, Texas plaintiffs likely face greater difficulty
than Florida plaintiffs in recovering for pure economic loss.
As in other jurisdictions, commercial fishermen are not granted a
special right to feral fish. Instead, Texas fishermen claims are based on the
denial of their state-granted public right to fish. In Golnoy Barge Co. v.
M/T Shinoussa, a Texas federal court found, “The commercial fishermen
recover not for injury to the fish stocks, but for physical interference with
their opportunity to fish. It is only during the closure period and in the
closed area that the spill actually interferes with their ability to fish.”213
In that case, a ship collided with a tank barge, spilling oil into the
Houston Ship Channel.214 However, the district court found that the
commercial fishermen could only recover for losses while the adjacent
Galveston Bay was closed.215 Therefore, under this jurisdictional
pronouncement, presumably once the bay reopened commercial fishermen
who could not yield the same number of fish due to a BP-like
contamination would be uncompensated for those losses. This result would
severely hinder the traditional protections for commercial fishermen. As
for other pollution plaintiffs, Texas common law firmly adheres to the
economic loss rule. As recently as 2009 a state appellate court held, “In tort
cases where there is an absence of privity of contract or, as in this case, an
absence of third-party beneficiary status, economic damages are not
recoverable unless they are accompanied by actual physical injury or
property damage.”216 Therefore, BP plaintiffs who are successful in
lodging common law claims in Texas will likely lose unless they can prove
physical injury or property damage.
F. Mississippi
The Mississippi Supreme Court has yet to formally adopt the economic
loss rule or define its contours within state law.217 Furthermore, outside the
context of products liability litigation, it is unclear how Mississippi state
law’s treatment of economic loss, as developed by its lower courts, would
affect BP litigation.218 Mississippi case law provides some indication that a
state tort claim would provide nowhere near the level of relief as would a
Florida claim following Curd.
In fact, in the leading Mississippi tort claim to reach the state supreme
213. Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
214. Golnoy Barge Co. v. M/T Shinoussa, No. 93-2021, 1993 WL 347219, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug.
19, 1993) (per curiam).
215. Golnoy Barge Co., 1993 WL 735038, at *3.
216. City of Alton v. Sharyland Water Supply Corp., 277 S.W.3d 132, 152–53 (Tex. App.
2009).
217. Progressive Ins. Co. v. Monaco Coach Corp., No. 1:05-cv-DMR-JMR, 2006 WL 839520,
at *3 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 29, 2006).
218. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 736 So. 2d 384, 386–88
(Miss. App. 1999) (upholding economic loss rule in products liability cases).
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court in this area, Masonite Corp. v. Steede,219 the court’s reasoning
suggests that even commercial fishermen would not be able to recover for
their damages under BP litigation. There, the plaintiff’s fishing resort was
“substantially destroyed” by wood fiber discharges from the defendant’s
manufacturing plant.220 The plaintiff sued for lost profits after fishermen
stopped patronizing his resort along the Pascagoula River.221 The court
ruled in favor of the plaintiff’s claim, finding the defendant liable for the
destruction of the plaintiff’s business.222
Two aspects of the Mississippi Court’s ruling, however, could be
burdensome for commercial fishermen claims. First, both here and
previously, the Mississippi court has reiterated that no private property
right exists to wild animals to which a plaintiff may claim a pecuniary
loss.223 Secondly, as at least one analysis has pointed out, the plaintiff’s
right to recovery did not merely result from damage to its business but
damage to its property rights associated with that commercial enterprise.224
Indeed, the court’s analysis strongly supports this proposition. Although
the court continually faults the defendant for destroying the plaintiff’s
fishery,225 the court appears to be referencing the physical location (i.e., the
plaintiff’s property), as opposed to an abstract commercial enterprise. For
instance, the plaintiff’s fishery business featured the rental or sale of boats
and bait and the supply of board and lodgings to patrons.226 Yet, the subject
of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s attention was on the property interest
affected by the contamination. The court noted that the “valuable rights”
destroyed, to which the plaintiff was entitled to compensation, were its
access to the Pascagoula River and its ability to exclude or allow others.227
The court also found that:
219. Masonite Corp. v. Steede (Masonite II), 23 So. 2d 756 (Miss. 1945) (en banc).
220. Masonite Corp. v. Steede (Masonite I), 21 So. 2d 463, 463 (Miss. 1945). The Mississippi
Supreme Court considered the Masonite Corp. v. Steede case twice in 1945—once in March and
again in November.
221. Id. at 463–64.
222. Masonite II, 23 So. 2d at 759.
223. Id. at 757–58 (noting that the plaintiff had “valuable rights” that existed from both its
ability to obtain access to the Pascagoula River and to deny access to others—but not recognizing
any rights to the fish therein); see also Masonite I, 21 So. 2d at 465 (Griffith, J., concurring) (“The
tort complained of was that the defendant killed the fish in the Pascagoula River, but plaintiff did
not own the fish or any legal right or interest therein whatsoever.”); Ex parte Fritz, 38 So. 722, 723
(Miss. 1905) (“It is perfectly clear that [Fritz] does not own the fish in Horn Lake, and this would
be true even if he owned the bed of the entire lake and all its waters. Fish are feræ naturæ. They are
incapable, until actually taken, of absolute ownership, except in artificial lakes or in small ponds
that are entirely land locked.”).
224. 33 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS (THIRD) 163, at § 16 (“Several courts have recognized that
commercial use is part of a plaintiff’s ‘use and enjoyment’ of property, so that loss in the property’s
commercial value due to contamination caused by the defendant is compensable.”) (citing Masonite
II, 23 So. 2d 756 (Miss. 1945) (en banc)).
225. Masonite II, 23 So. 2d at 758 (noting the “practical destruction of the [plaintiff’s]
fishery”).
226. Masonite I, 21 So. 2d at 463.
227. Masonite II, 23 So. 2d at 757–58.
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One of the elements of the value of the [plaintiff’s]
right to permit others to obtain, or exclude others from
obtaining, access to this river in order to fish therein, was
to use it to promote a commercial purpose . . . . In order for
persons permitted by [the plaintiff] to obtain access to the
river to be enabled to fish therein, they must have fishing
tackle, bait, boats, and if they remain there for any length of
time food and lodging, the furnishing of which is so closely
related to the [plaintiff’s] right to permit persons to obtain
access to the river on her own terms as to become virtually
a part of it. If the killing of the fish caused persons to
discontinue availing themselves of the [plaintiff’s] fishing
facilities, the principal element of the value of this right of
the [plaintiff] was destroyed; and she is entitled to damages
therefor . . . .228
Therefore, read narrowly, Masonite Corp. is not a complete abrogation
of the economic loss rule. The contamination resulted in an injury to the
plaintiff’s property as a result of the near-evisceration of the commercial
enterprise therein due to the contamination of the river. Nowhere in the
opinion does it even remotely suggest that all third parties negatively
impacted by the contamination could claim damages from a defendantcorporation. Translated into the BP oil spill context—and with no official
Mississippi adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s commercial fishermen
exception in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen—Mississippi’s tort protections would
not aid commercial fishermen, who have no proprietary interest in
uncaught fish and likely no real property interest that could be directly
devalued by a contamination. Masonite Corp., however, could conceivably
assist coastal businesses, such as resorts or hotels, that grant access to the
Gulf and whose commercial enterprises on this real property were
devalued as a direct result of the contamination.
Beyond mere conjecture, other support exists that Mississippi courts
have not discarded the economic loss rule. In East Mississippi Electric
Power Ass’n v. Porcelain Products Co.,229 a federal court in Mississippi
predicted that Mississippi state courts would uphold the rule.230 Although
that case was a products liability action involving insulators for power
lines, the court found that, “Mississippi courts would embrace the rule of
no recovery in tort for economic damages.”231 Therefore, although
Mississippi’s rule has not been crystallized by its supreme court,
Mississippi likely would offer fewer protections than would be afforded
under Curd.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 758 (emphasis added).
729 F. Supp. 512 (S.D. Miss. 1990).
Id. at 514.
Id. at 517.
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CONCLUSION
In two major respects, the Florida Supreme Court has adopted a rule for
recovery of pure economic losses that is far more inclusive of these claims
than its fellow Gulf states. This distinction could affect the outcomes of not
only potential BP litigation, but also other tort suits affecting the Gulf of
Mexico and other waterways. First, Florida’s high court adopted a
protection for commercial fishermen that seemingly does not exclude lost
profits from allowable damages and does not limit losses to only the period
in which no opportunity to fish existed. Second, beyond merely
recognizing a commercial fishermen exception to the economic loss rule,
the Florida Supreme Court also affirmed the use of a “zone of risk”
analysis for determining whether defendants did, in fact, owe a duty to
plaintiffs. Justice Polston’s denouncement of the court’s failure to delimit
the outer bounds of this zone and to identify and limit those parties whose
interests would be protected may well prove to be noteworthy as future
litigation unfolds. This uncertainty is unquestionably ripe for further
clarification by the Florida Supreme Court. If the court fails to do so,
Florida may become not only the mecca for Gulf pollution litigation, but
also a jurisdiction where neither potential tortfeasors, nor insurers, nor
courts know exactly who fits into the indeterminate class.
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